Merge pull request 'infra(deploy): serve MCP on multiple domains + SKIP_BUILD' (#4) from infra/deploy-multidomain into main

The BearerAuth middleware matched a per-analyst token but only stashed it on
request.state, which the FastMCP tools never see — so the query log line logged
rows/sql with no caller, defeating the per-token attribution the auth design
promises. Bridge the caller name through a ContextVar (anyio propagates it into
the worker thread that runs each sync tool) and include it in the query() log.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.dockerignore

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+# NOTE: uv.lock is intentionally NOT ignored — the Dockerfile copies it for
+# reproducible `uv sync --frozen` builds.
 .git
 .venv
 __pycache__

.gitignore

@@ -7,4 +7,5 @@ __pycache__/
 .DS_Store
 .ruff_cache/
 .mypy_cache/
-uv.lock
+# uv.lock IS committed on purpose — the Docker build uses `uv sync --frozen` for
+# reproducible installs, and the Coolify build clones the repo (it must include it).

Dockerfile

@@ -11,15 +11,26 @@ COPY --from=ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:latest /uv /uvx /bin/
 WORKDIR /app
 
 # Install ONLY dependencies (flat module — the project itself is not a package).
-COPY pyproject.toml ./
-RUN uv sync --no-dev --no-install-project
+# Copy the lockfile and build --frozen so rebuilds are reproducible: without it,
+# `uv sync` re-resolves the >= ranges in pyproject.toml and a redeploy could pull a
+# newer, behaviour-changed mcp/starlette and break the running server.
+COPY pyproject.toml uv.lock ./
+RUN uv sync --no-dev --no-install-project --frozen
 ENV PATH="/app/.venv/bin:$PATH"
 
 COPY analytics_mcp.py ./
 
+# Run as a non-root user (least privilege; nothing here needs root).
+RUN useradd -m -u 10001 app && chown -R app:app /app
+USER app
+
 EXPOSE 8892
 
 HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s --start-period=10s --retries=3 \
   CMD python -c "import urllib.request,sys; sys.exit(0 if urllib.request.urlopen('http://localhost:8892/healthz').status==200 else 1)" || exit 1
 
-CMD ["uvicorn", "analytics_mcp:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "8892", "--workers", "2"]
+# Single worker: this is a low-traffic read-only proxy for a handful of analysts, and
+# the DB connection budget = workers × MCP_POOL_MAX. One worker (× default pool 8) caps
+# the MCP at 8 backends instead of 16, which matters on a shared 100-connection DB.
+# Scale out by raising MCP_POOL_MAX, not workers, so the budget stays obvious.
+CMD ["uvicorn", "analytics_mcp:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "8892", "--workers", "1"]

analytics_mcp.py

@@ -26,9 +26,12 @@ Env:
 """
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import contextvars
+import hmac
 import logging
 import os
 import re
+import threading
 import time
 from contextlib import contextmanager
 
@@ -57,11 +60,18 @@ def _get_logger(name: str) -> logging.Logger:
         )
         root.addHandler(handler)
         root.setLevel(logging.INFO)
+        root.propagate = False   # don't double-emit through uvicorn's root handler
     return root.getChild(name)
 
 
 log = _get_logger("server")
 
+# Per-request caller name, set by BearerAuth from the matched token so the tools can
+# attribute each query to an analyst in the logs. A ContextVar (not a tool arg) because
+# FastMCP tools never receive the HTTP request; anyio propagates the context into the
+# worker thread that runs each sync tool. Defaults to "?" if auth ever didn't run.
+_caller_var: contextvars.ContextVar[str] = contextvars.ContextVar("caller", default="?")
+
 DATABASE_URL = os.environ["DATABASE_URL"]          # analytics_ro DSN (set by deploy)
 MAX_ROWS_CEIL = int(os.getenv("MCP_MAX_ROWS", "10000"))
 # Schemas the introspection helpers (list_tables/describe_table/sample_table) expose.
@@ -78,26 +88,89 @@ READABLE_SCHEMAS = tuple(
 # Force read-only + a statement timeout at the connection level (belt + braces;
 # the analytics_ro role already sets these, but a self-contained server is safer
 # in case it is ever pointed at a less-restricted DSN).
-_pool = psycopg2.pool.ThreadedConnectionPool(
-    1,
-    int(os.getenv("MCP_POOL_MAX", "8")),
-    DATABASE_URL,
-    options="-c default_transaction_read_only=on -c statement_timeout=30000 -c client_encoding=UTF8",
+POOL_MAX = int(os.getenv("MCP_POOL_MAX", "8"))
+_POOL_OPTS = "-c default_transaction_read_only=on -c statement_timeout=30000 -c client_encoding=UTF8"
+
+
+def _init_pool(retries: int = 5, delay: float = 2.0) -> psycopg2.pool.ThreadedConnectionPool:
+    """Create the pool, retrying so a brief DB outage at deploy time doesn't crash
+    the worker into a boot loop. minconn=0 → no eager connect at import (connections
+    are opened lazily on first use)."""
+    last: Exception | None = None
+    for attempt in range(1, retries + 1):
+        try:
+            return psycopg2.pool.ThreadedConnectionPool(
+                0, POOL_MAX, DATABASE_URL, options=_POOL_OPTS
+            )
+        except psycopg2.OperationalError as exc:
+            last = exc
+            log.warning("pool init attempt %d/%d failed: %s", attempt, retries, exc)
+            if attempt < retries:
+                time.sleep(delay)
+    assert last is not None
+    raise last
+
+
+_pool = _init_pool()
+# FastMCP runs each sync tool in an anyio worker thread (default ~40). Gate checkouts
+# behind a bounded semaphore so that >POOL_MAX concurrent queries QUEUE (block in
+# their worker thread) instead of overflowing the pool and raising PoolError — a 500
+# to the analyst. The event loop is never blocked; only surplus worker threads wait.
+_pool_slots = threading.BoundedSemaphore(POOL_MAX)
+
+# SQLSTATE classes that mean the CONNECTION is gone (vs. a query that merely failed,
+# e.g. a statement_timeout, which is QueryCanceled / 57014 and leaves the conn usable).
+# class 08 = connection exception; 57P01/02/03 = admin/crash shutdown.
+_DISCONNECT_SQLSTATES = frozenset(
+    {"08000", "08003", "08006", "08001", "08004", "08007", "57P01", "57P02", "57P03"}
 )
 
 
+def _is_disconnect(exc: Exception) -> bool:
+    """True only for a genuinely lost connection — so we discard/retry on a dropped
+    socket but NOT on a statement_timeout or other in-session query error."""
+    if isinstance(exc, psycopg2.InterfaceError):
+        return True
+    if isinstance(exc, psycopg2.OperationalError):
+        code = getattr(exc, "pgcode", None)
+        return code is None or code in _DISCONNECT_SQLSTATES   # None = socket-level failure
+    return False
+
+
 @contextmanager
 def _ro_conn():
-    """Read-only connection; the transaction is ALWAYS rolled back (never commits)."""
-    conn = _pool.getconn()
+    """Read-only connection; the transaction is ALWAYS rolled back (never commits).
+
+    Dead connections (DB restart, network blip, crash) are DISCARDED rather than
+    recycled — otherwise a single broken socket poisons the pool and every later
+    query handed that connection fails until the container is recreated. A query that
+    merely errors (e.g. statement_timeout) leaves the connection healthy, so it is
+    rolled back and returned to the pool as normal."""
+    _pool_slots.acquire()
+    try:
+        conn = _pool.getconn()
+    except Exception:
+        _pool_slots.release()
+        raise
+    broken = False
     try:
         conn.set_session(readonly=True, autocommit=False)
         yield conn
+    except Exception as exc:
+        broken = _is_disconnect(exc)
+        raise
     finally:
         try:
-            conn.rollback()
+            if broken or conn.closed:
+                _pool.putconn(conn, close=True)
+            else:
+                try:
+                    conn.rollback()
+                    _pool.putconn(conn)
+                except (psycopg2.OperationalError, psycopg2.InterfaceError):
+                    _pool.putconn(conn, close=True)
         finally:
-            _pool.putconn(conn)
+            _pool_slots.release()
 
 
 def _rows(cur) -> list[dict]:
@@ -135,6 +208,13 @@ def _strip_comments(sql: str) -> str:
     return sql.strip()
 
 
+def _strip_literals(sql: str) -> str:
+    """Blank out the contents of single-quoted string literals so the keyword guard
+    does not fire on DATA (e.g. WHERE summary ILIKE '%please delete%'). '' escapes
+    are handled so we don't mis-terminate a literal mid-string."""
+    return re.sub(r"'(?:[^']|'')*'", "''", sql)
+
+
 def _guard(sql: str) -> str:
     """Validate a single read-only statement; return the cleaned statement."""
     stripped = _strip_comments(sql)
@@ -146,7 +226,11 @@ def _guard(sql: str) -> str:
     stmt = parts[0].strip()
     if not re.match(r"^(select|with)\b", stmt, re.IGNORECASE):
         raise ValueError("Only SELECT / WITH queries are allowed.")
-    if _FORBIDDEN.search(stmt):
+    # Scan with string literals blanked: the blocklist's real job is to reject
+    # data-modifying CTEs (WITH x AS (DELETE ... RETURNING ...)), not to trip over a
+    # keyword that merely appears inside a filter value. (Writes are impossible anyway
+    # via the analytics_ro GRANTs + the read-only, rolled-back transaction.)
+    if _FORBIDDEN.search(_strip_literals(stmt)):
         raise ValueError("Query contains a forbidden (write/DDL) keyword.")
     return stmt
 
@@ -179,28 +263,44 @@ mcp = FastMCP("fireside-analytics", stateless_http=True, transport_security=_tra
 def query(sql: str, max_rows: int = 1000) -> dict:
     """Run a read-only SELECT/WITH query against the fleet database.
 
-    Only the reporting.* and tracksolid.* schemas are readable. Single statement
-    only; write/DDL is rejected. Returns up to `max_rows` rows (default 1000, hard
-    cap 10000). A LIMIT is auto-applied when absent. Result: {row_count, truncated, rows}.
+    Readable schemas are the analytics_ro grant surface (reporting, tracksolid,
+    tickets, fuel by default). Single statement only; write/DDL is rejected. Returns
+    up to `max_rows` rows (default 1000, hard cap 10000). A LIMIT is auto-applied when
+    absent. Result: {row_count, truncated, rows}.
     """
     stmt = _guard(sql)
     cap = max(1, min(int(max_rows), MAX_ROWS_CEIL))
     if not re.search(r"\blimit\b", stmt, re.IGNORECASE):
         stmt = f"{stmt}\nLIMIT {cap + 1}"   # +1 row to detect truncation
     t0 = time.monotonic()
-    with _ro_conn() as conn, conn.cursor() as cur:
-        cur.execute(stmt)
-        rows = _rows(cur)
+    # Retry once on a dead connection (only): _ro_conn() discards broken sockets, so a
+    # second attempt gets a fresh one — making a recycled-but-stale pool connection
+    # invisible to the analyst. A real query error (statement_timeout, bad SQL) is NOT
+    # retried; it surfaces immediately.
+    rows = []
+    for attempt in (1, 2):
+        try:
+            with _ro_conn() as conn, conn.cursor() as cur:
+                cur.execute(stmt)
+                rows = _rows(cur)
+            break
+        except Exception as exc:
+            if attempt == 2 or not _is_disconnect(exc):
+                raise
+            log.warning("stale DB connection on attempt %d — retrying once", attempt)
     truncated = len(rows) > cap
     rows = rows[:cap]
     dur_ms = int((time.monotonic() - t0) * 1000)
-    log.info("query rows=%d trunc=%s %dms :: %s", len(rows), truncated, dur_ms, sql[:200])
+    log.info(
+        "query caller=%s rows=%d trunc=%s %dms :: %s",
+        _caller_var.get(), len(rows), truncated, dur_ms, sql[:200],
+    )
     return {"row_count": len(rows), "truncated": truncated, "rows": rows}
 
 
 @mcp.tool()
 def list_schemas() -> list[dict]:
-    """List the readable schemas (reporting, tracksolid) with their object counts."""
+    """List the readable schemas (reporting, tracksolid, tickets, fuel) with object counts."""
     with _ro_conn() as conn, conn.cursor() as cur:
         cur.execute(
             "SELECT table_schema AS schema, count(*) AS objects "
@@ -213,7 +313,7 @@ def list_schemas() -> list[dict]:
 
 @mcp.tool()
 def list_tables(schema: str) -> list[dict]:
-    """List tables + views in a schema (must be reporting or tracksolid)."""
+    """List tables + views in a schema (must be one of the readable schemas)."""
     if schema not in READABLE_SCHEMAS:
         raise ValueError(f"schema must be one of {READABLE_SCHEMAS}")
     with _ro_conn() as conn, conn.cursor() as cur:
@@ -280,21 +380,35 @@ _TOKENS = {
 }
 
 
+def _lookup_token(token: str) -> str | None:
+    """Constant-time token match: compare against every known token so the response
+    time does not reveal how far a guessed prefix matched. Cheap for a handful of
+    per-analyst tokens."""
+    if not token:
+        return None
+    match = None
+    for known, name in _TOKENS.items():
+        if hmac.compare_digest(token, known):
+            match = name
+    return match
+
+
 class BearerAuth(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
     async def dispatch(self, request, call_next):
         if request.url.path == "/healthz":
             return await call_next(request)
         auth = request.headers.get("authorization", "")
         token = auth[7:] if auth.lower().startswith("bearer ") else ""
-        caller = _TOKENS.get(token)
+        caller = _lookup_token(token)
         if caller is None:
             return JSONResponse({"error": "unauthorized"}, status_code=401)
         request.state.caller = caller
+        _caller_var.set(caller)   # so the tools can attribute the query in the logs
         return await call_next(request)
 
 
 async def healthz(_request):
-    return JSONResponse({"ok": True, "tokens": len(_TOKENS)})
+    return JSONResponse({"ok": True})
 
 
 app = mcp.streamable_http_app()

deploy.sh

@@ -24,6 +24,20 @@ set -euo pipefail
 NAME=analytics_mcp
 PORT=8892
 HOST_DOMAIN="${HOST_DOMAIN:-fleetmcp.fivetitude.com}"   # prod: fleetmcp.rahamafresh.com
+# Comma-separated list of every domain this service answers on (defaults to
+# HOST_DOMAIN). All are folded into ONE Traefik router rule so a single cert
+# covers them and connectors on either domain keep working.
+HOST_DOMAINS="${HOST_DOMAINS:-$HOST_DOMAIN}"
+BT='`'
+RULE=""
+IFS=',' read -ra _DOMS <<< "$HOST_DOMAINS"
+for _d in "${_DOMS[@]}"; do
+  _d="${_d// /}"
+  if [ -n "$_d" ]; then
+    seg="Host(${BT}${_d}${BT})"
+    if [ -z "$RULE" ]; then RULE="$seg"; else RULE="$RULE || $seg"; fi
+  fi
+done
 IMAGE="fleetanalytics-mcp:latest"
 ENV_FILE="$(pwd)/.deploy.env"
 
@@ -53,9 +67,15 @@ RO_PW=$(cat "${ANALYTICS_RO_PW_FILE:-$HOME/.analytics_ro.pw}" 2>/dev/null || tru
 HOSTPART="${SRC_DB_URL#*@}"                       # host:port/dbname[?params]
 RO_DB_URL="postgresql://analytics_ro:${RO_PW}@${HOSTPART}"
 
-# Build the image from this repo.
-echo "Building $IMAGE ..."
-docker build -t "$IMAGE" .
+# Build the image from this repo (SKIP_BUILD=1 reuses the existing image for a
+# labels/env-only change — no new code is pulled in).
+if [ "${SKIP_BUILD:-0}" = "1" ]; then
+  echo "SKIP_BUILD=1 — reusing existing $IMAGE (no rebuild)."
+  docker image inspect "$IMAGE" >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "ERROR: $IMAGE not present"; exit 1; }
+else
+  echo "Building $IMAGE ..."
+  docker build -t "$IMAGE" .
+fi
 
 # Minimal env (read-only DSN + auth only — no Tracksolid ingestion secrets).
 { echo "DATABASE_URL=${RO_DB_URL}"; echo "MCP_AUTH_TOKENS=${MCP_AUTH_TOKENS}"; } > "$ENV_FILE"
@@ -65,14 +85,18 @@ docker rm -f "$NAME" 2>/dev/null || true
 docker run -d --name "$NAME" --restart unless-stopped \
   --network "$APPNET" \
   --env-file "$ENV_FILE" \
+  --log-opt max-size=10m --log-opt max-file=5 \
   --label 'traefik.enable=true' \
   --label 'traefik.docker.network=coolify' \
   --label 'traefik.http.middlewares.redirect-to-https.redirectscheme.scheme=https' \
+  --label 'traefik.http.middlewares.fleetmcp-ratelimit.ratelimit.average=30' \
+  --label 'traefik.http.middlewares.fleetmcp-ratelimit.ratelimit.burst=60' \
   --label "traefik.http.routers.http-0-fleetmcp.entryPoints=http" \
   --label "traefik.http.routers.http-0-fleetmcp.middlewares=redirect-to-https" \
-  --label "traefik.http.routers.http-0-fleetmcp.rule=Host(\`${HOST_DOMAIN}\`)" \
+  --label "traefik.http.routers.http-0-fleetmcp.rule=${RULE}" \
   --label "traefik.http.routers.https-0-fleetmcp.entryPoints=https" \
-  --label "traefik.http.routers.https-0-fleetmcp.rule=Host(\`${HOST_DOMAIN}\`)" \
+  --label "traefik.http.routers.https-0-fleetmcp.rule=${RULE}" \
+  --label "traefik.http.routers.https-0-fleetmcp.middlewares=fleetmcp-ratelimit" \
   --label "traefik.http.routers.https-0-fleetmcp.tls=true" \
   --label "traefik.http.routers.https-0-fleetmcp.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt" \
   --label "traefik.http.services.fleetmcp.loadbalancer.server.port=${PORT}" \

pgbouncer/.gitignore

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-# The real userlist holds the pgbouncer_auth verifier — never commit it.
-userlist.txt

pgbouncer/README.md

@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
-# PgBouncer for `timescale_db` (connection pooling)
-
-> **Scope note:** this is **stack-wide infrastructure**, shared by every service that
-> talks to `timescale_db` — it is only *parked* in the analytics-MCP repo because that
-> is where the "too many connections" investigation happened. It arguably belongs in
-> the backend/ingestion repo (`tracksolid_timescale_grafana_prod`). Move it there when
-> convenient.
-
-## Why
-
-The DB runs at `max_connections = 100`. About nine services each keep a persistent
-pool open — and several connect as the **`postgres` superuser**, holding connections
-**idle for hours**. When those pools fill under load simultaneously, the sum crosses
-~97 and new connections fail with `FATAL: sorry, too many clients already`.
-
-PgBouncer fixes this structurally: clients connect to PgBouncer (cheap, thousands
-allowed), and it multiplexes them onto a **small, fixed set** of real backend
-connections. The DB's connection count then depends on the pool size you choose, not
-on how many app pools exist.
-
-```
-9 app pools  ──▶  PgBouncer :6432  ──▶  ≤25 real backends  ──▶  timescale_db :5432
- (hundreds)        (transaction mode)
-```
-
-## Files
-
-| File | Purpose |
-|---|---|
-| `pgbouncer.ini` | pooling + auth config (transaction mode, `auth_query`) |
-| `auth_setup.sql` | creates `pgbouncer_auth` + `pgbouncer.user_lookup()` on the DB |
-| `userlist.txt.example` | how to generate the real (gitignored) `userlist.txt` |
-| `docker-compose.yml` | the PgBouncer service (join the DB network) |
-
-## Deploy (once)
-
-```bash
-# 0) on the host, generate a password for the auth role
-( umask 077; openssl rand -hex 24 > ~/.pgbouncer_auth.pw )
-
-# 1) create the auth role + lookup function (as postgres superuser)
-DB=$(docker ps --filter name=timescale_db --format '{{.Names}}' | head -1)
-docker exec -i "$DB" psql -U postgres -d tracksolid_db -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 \
-  -v pgb_pw="$(cat ~/.pgbouncer_auth.pw)" < pgbouncer/auth_setup.sql
-
-# 2) build userlist.txt from the stored verifier (formats always match this way)
-docker exec -i "$DB" psql -U postgres -d tracksolid_db -tAc \
-  "SELECT '\"pgbouncer_auth\" \"' || passwd || '\"' \
-     FROM pg_shadow WHERE usename='pgbouncer_auth'" > pgbouncer/userlist.txt
-
-# 3) set the real DB network name in docker-compose.yml (networks.dbnet.name), then:
-docker compose -f pgbouncer/docker-compose.yml up -d
-```
-
-## Cut services over (incrementally)
-
-Repoint each app's `DATABASE_URL` host/port from `timescale_db:5432` to
-`pgbouncer:6432` — **same** dbname, user, and password — and redeploy it.
-
-**Migrate the superuser app pools first** (`webhook_receiver`, `ingest_worker`,
-`dashboard_api` backend, `worker`/`cron`/`gateway`) — they are the heaviest
-consumers. Do them one at a time and watch `SHOW POOLS;` (below).
-
-## ⚠️ Transaction-pooling caveats — read before cutting over
-
-`pool_mode = transaction` returns the backend to the pool at every COMMIT/ROLLBACK,
-so **session-scoped features don't survive across transactions**:
-
-- **Server-side prepared statements** — the app must not rely on them, or set the
-  driver to not cache them (e.g. asyncpg `statement_cache_size=0`; libpq simple
-  query / psycopg2 default is fine). PgBouncer ≥1.21 supports prepared statements in
-  transaction mode if you set `max_prepared_statements > 0` — enable that if an app
-  needs them.
-- **`SET`/`RESET` that must persist between transactions**, session `LISTEN/NOTIFY`,
-  advisory locks held across transactions, `WITH HOLD` cursors, session temp tables.
-- **Per-connection `options` startup GUCs are ignored** (see `ignore_startup_parameters`).
-  Apps that set GUCs via the `options=` DSN param must instead pin them at the **role**
-  level: `ALTER ROLE <app> SET statement_timeout = '...';` etc.
-
-### The analytics MCP specifically
-
-The MCP sends `options=-c default_transaction_read_only=on -c statement_timeout=30000`
-on its DSN and calls `set_session(readonly=True)`. Behind transaction pooling:
-
-- The `options` GUCs are dropped — **but** `analytics_ro` already has
-  `default_transaction_read_only=on` and `statement_timeout=30s` pinned at the role
-  level (`scripts/analytics_ro_role.sql`), so read-only enforcement is preserved.
-- `set_session(readonly=True)` issues a `SET` that can leak across pooled clients.
-  Before pointing the MCP at PgBouncer, either drop that call (role default covers it)
-  or run the **MCP only in `session` pooling** (add a second `[databases]` alias with
-  `pool_mode=session`). Given the MCP is a *minor* consumer, the simplest path is to
-  **leave the MCP connecting directly** and pool only the heavy superuser apps.
-
-## Operating
-
-```bash
-# admin console
-docker exec -it pgbouncer psql -h 127.0.0.1 -p 6432 -U pgbouncer_auth pgbouncer
-#   SHOW POOLS;     -- cl_active / sv_active / waiting per pool
-#   SHOW CLIENTS;   -- connected clients
-#   SHOW STATS;     -- throughput
-
-# sanity: confirm the DB now sees a small, stable backend count
-docker exec -i "$DB" psql -U postgres -d tracksolid_db -c \
-  "SELECT usename, count(*) FROM pg_stat_activity GROUP BY 1 ORDER BY 2 DESC;"
-```
-
-**Sizing rule:** total backends PgBouncer opens = `Σ(default_pool_size per database) +
-reserve_pool_size`. Keep that **well under** `max_connections` (100), leaving headroom
-for superuser/admin/background-worker connections that bypass PgBouncer. The shipped
-config (20 + 5 reserve, one database) tops out at ~25 backends.

pgbouncer/auth_setup.sql

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
--- auth_setup.sql — create the PgBouncer auth_query plumbing on tracksolid_db.
--- ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
--- Run ONCE as the postgres SUPERUSER (the SECURITY DEFINER function must be owned by
--- a superuser to read pg_shadow). Apply with:
---   docker exec -i <timescale_db> psql -U postgres -d tracksolid_db \
---     -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -v pgb_pw="$(cat ~/.pgbouncer_auth.pw)" < auth_setup.sql
---
--- This lets PgBouncer authenticate ANY app user by looking its stored SCRAM verifier
--- up at connect time — so you never hand-maintain a userlist of every app password.
--- Only the pgbouncer_auth role itself needs an entry in userlist.txt.
-
-\set ON_ERROR_STOP on
-
--- 1) A minimal LOGIN role PgBouncer uses to run the lookup. No other privileges.
-DO $$
-BEGIN
-  IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'pgbouncer_auth') THEN
-    CREATE ROLE pgbouncer_auth LOGIN NOSUPERUSER NOCREATEDB NOCREATEROLE;
-  END IF;
-END $$;
-ALTER ROLE pgbouncer_auth WITH LOGIN PASSWORD :'pgb_pw';
-
--- 2) The lookup function. SECURITY DEFINER (owned by postgres) so it can read
---    pg_shadow; returns exactly (username, scram_verifier) for one user.
-CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS pgbouncer AUTHORIZATION postgres;
-
-CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION pgbouncer.user_lookup(
-  IN i_username text, OUT uname text, OUT phash text
-) RETURNS record
-  LANGUAGE sql
-  SECURITY DEFINER
-  SET search_path = pg_catalog
-AS $$
-  SELECT usename, passwd FROM pg_catalog.pg_shadow WHERE usename = i_username;
-$$;
-
--- 3) Lock the function down to ONLY pgbouncer_auth.
-REVOKE ALL   ON FUNCTION pgbouncer.user_lookup(text) FROM public;
-GRANT  USAGE ON SCHEMA pgbouncer TO pgbouncer_auth;
-GRANT  EXECUTE ON FUNCTION pgbouncer.user_lookup(text) TO pgbouncer_auth;

pgbouncer/docker-compose.yml

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-# docker-compose.yml — PgBouncer in front of timescale_db.
-# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# Deploy:
-#   1. Apply auth_setup.sql to the DB as postgres (creates pgbouncer_auth + lookup fn).
-#   2. Generate pgbouncer/userlist.txt (see userlist.txt.example).
-#   3. Put this stack on the SAME docker network as timescale_db so `timescale_db`
-#      resolves (the tracksolid stack's network — the one with the 10.0.15.x addrs).
-#   4. `docker compose -f pgbouncer/docker-compose.yml up -d`
-#   5. Repoint each app's DSN host:port from timescale_db:5432 → pgbouncer:6432
-#      (same dbname/user/password) and redeploy it. Migrate the SUPERUSER app pools
-#      first — they are the heaviest consumers.
-services:
-  pgbouncer:
-    image: edoburu/pgbouncer:latest      # pin to a digest/tag in prod
-    container_name: pgbouncer
-    restart: unless-stopped
-    networks: [dbnet]
-    ports:
-      - "6432:6432"                       # drop this if only in-network apps connect
-    volumes:
-      - ./pgbouncer.ini:/etc/pgbouncer/pgbouncer.ini:ro
-      - ./userlist.txt:/etc/pgbouncer/userlist.txt:ro
-    logging:
-      driver: json-file
-      options: { max-size: "10m", max-file: "5" }
-    healthcheck:
-      # `SHOW VERSION` on the admin console proves PgBouncer is accepting connections.
-      test: ["CMD-SHELL", "psql -h 127.0.0.1 -p 6432 -U pgbouncer_auth pgbouncer -tAc 'SHOW VERSION' || exit 1"]
-      interval: 30s
-      timeout: 3s
-      retries: 3
-      start_period: 10s
-
-networks:
-  # Attach to the EXISTING network that can reach timescale_db (external = pre-created
-  # by the tracksolid/Coolify stack). Set the real name here, e.g. the network shown by
-  #   docker inspect timescale_db --format '{{range $k,$v := .NetworkSettings.Networks}}{{$k}}{{"\n"}}{{end}}'
-  dbnet:
-    external: true
-    name: CHANGE_ME_tracksolid_db_network

pgbouncer/pgbouncer.ini

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-; pgbouncer.ini — transaction-pooling front for timescale_db (tracksolid_db).
-; ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-; Purpose: the DB runs at max_connections=100 and ~9 stack services each hold a
-; persistent pool (several as the postgres superuser, idle for hours), so peaks hit
-; "too many connections". PgBouncer multiplexes MANY client connections onto a SMALL
-; set of real backend connections, so the DB connection count stays bounded no matter
-; how many app pools exist.
-;
-; Auth uses auth_query (NOT a hand-maintained userlist of every app): PgBouncer logs
-; in as `pgbouncer_auth` and looks each user's verifier up via pgbouncer.user_lookup()
-; — see auth_setup.sql. Only the pgbouncer_auth verifier lives in userlist.txt.
-
-[databases]
-; Apps point their DSN host at pgbouncer:6432 with the SAME dbname/user/password.
-; `host` here is the real DB (the timescale_db container hostname on the DB network).
-tracksolid_db = host=timescale_db port=5432 dbname=tracksolid_db
-
-[pgbouncer]
-listen_addr = 0.0.0.0
-listen_port = 6432
-
-; ── Auth (pass-through via auth_query) ──────────────────────────────────────
-auth_type  = scram-sha-256
-auth_file  = /etc/pgbouncer/userlist.txt
-auth_user  = pgbouncer_auth
-auth_query = SELECT uname, phash FROM pgbouncer.user_lookup($1)
-
-; ── Pooling ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-; transaction mode = a server connection is returned to the pool at COMMIT/ROLLBACK,
-; so a handful of backends serve hundreds of clients. See README for the feature
-; caveats (no session-level prepared statements / SET that persists across txns).
-pool_mode = transaction
-
-; Total backend connections PgBouncer will ever open to the DB =
-;   (number of [databases] entries) × default_pool_size  + reserve_pool_size.
-; Keep the SUM across all poolers well under the DB's max_connections (100).
-; With one database and 20 + 5 reserve = 25 backends max — leaving headroom for
-; superuser/admin/background-worker connections that bypass PgBouncer.
-default_pool_size   = 20
-min_pool_size       = 0
-reserve_pool_size   = 5
-reserve_pool_timeout = 3
-
-; Clients can be plentiful (cheap) — only backends are scarce.
-max_client_conn = 2000
-
-; Recycle idle/old server connections so none linger for hours.
-server_idle_timeout = 300
-server_lifetime     = 3600
-
-; ── Robustness ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-; Apps set per-connection GUCs via the `options` startup param (e.g. the analytics
-; MCP sends `-c default_transaction_read_only=on -c statement_timeout=...`). In
-; transaction pooling those can't be honored per-shared-backend, so ignore them and
-; rely on ROLE-level settings (ALTER ROLE ... SET ...) instead. See README.
-ignore_startup_parameters = extra_float_digits,options,search_path
-
-; Admin/stats console (psql -p 6432 pgbouncer) — restricted to the auth role.
-admin_users = pgbouncer_auth
-stats_users = pgbouncer_auth
-
-; Quiet by default; flip to 1 temporarily when debugging.
-log_connections    = 0
-log_disconnections = 0

pgbouncer/userlist.txt.example

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-# userlist.txt — ONLY the pgbouncer_auth role needs an entry; every other user is
-# resolved at connect time by auth_query (pgbouncer.user_lookup). See README.
-#
-# The real userlist.txt is gitignored (it holds a credential). Generate it from the
-# pgbouncer_auth password you set in auth_setup.sql — PgBouncer accepts the verifier
-# in SCRAM form. Easiest: copy the stored verifier straight from Postgres so the
-# formats always match:
-#
-#   docker exec -i <timescale_db> psql -U postgres -d tracksolid_db -tAc \
-#     "SELECT '\"pgbouncer_auth\" \"' || passwd || '\"' \
-#        FROM pg_shadow WHERE usename='pgbouncer_auth'" > pgbouncer/userlist.txt
-#
-# That yields a line of the form (SCRAM-SHA-256 verifier shown abbreviated):
-"pgbouncer_auth" "SCRAM-SHA-256$4096:....$....:...."

scripts/analytics_ro_role.sql

@@ -62,3 +62,9 @@ ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES FOR ROLE postgres         IN SCHEMA fuel       GRANT EX
 ALTER ROLE analytics_ro SET default_transaction_read_only = on;
 ALTER ROLE analytics_ro SET statement_timeout = '30s';
 ALTER ROLE analytics_ro SET idle_in_transaction_session_timeout = '60s';
+-- Cap idle POOLED connections too (these sit idle but NOT in a transaction, so the
+-- idle_in_transaction timeout never reaps them). On a shared 100-connection DB this
+-- returns slots the MCP isn't using. Safe with the server's dead-connection handling:
+-- a reaped pooled connection is discarded + transparently retried, not surfaced as an
+-- error. (Requires PostgreSQL 14+.)
+ALTER ROLE analytics_ro SET idle_session_timeout = '5min';